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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Madhat Zubi filed this civil action 
against AT&T Corporation, alleging that he was discharged 
because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1981. The 
District Court dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as barred by a two-year 
statute of limitations. Zubi argues that the District Court 
erred in applying a two-year statute of limitations instead of 
the four-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. 
S 1658. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Mr. Zubi filed the complaint in this case on July 30, 
1998, in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. It alleges that Zubi was discharged by AT&T 
because of his race on September 28, 1995. The District 
Court, applying the teachings of Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 
261 (1985), and its progeny, "borrowed" New Jersey's two- 
year statute of limitations for personal injury cases and 
found Zubi's claim time barred. 
 
Zubi's claim arises under 42 U.S.C. S 1981, which 
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts 
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." In Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989), the 
Supreme Court held that the "make and enforce contracts" 
language of section 1981 proscribed discriminatory hiring 
but not discriminatory termination of employment. 
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Congress responded to the Patterson decision in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 by amending section 1981. The 
amendments, inter alia, made the preexisting language of 
section 1981, quoted above, subsection (a) and added a 
subsection (b) to section 1981 which defined the phrase 
"make and enforce contracts" as "the making, performance, 
modification, and termination of contracts and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of 
the contractual relationship." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-166, S 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981(b)) (emphasis added). Following the 1991 
amendments, section 1981 "clearly prohibits discriminatory 
conduct that occurs both before and after the 
establishment of the contractual relationship." Perry v. 
Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the 1991 amendment to section 
1981 "creates liabilities that had no legal existence before 
the Act was passed." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 
U.S. 298, 313 (1994). 
 
The issue presented to us is a purely legal one, which we 
review de novo. See Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Assocs., 
173 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). Zubi argues that the 
District Court erred in "borrowing" New Jersey's two-year 
statute of limitations for personal injury cases. Zubi bases 
his argument on 28 U.S.C. S 1658, which provides as 
follows: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action 
       arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date 
       of the enactment of this section may not be 
       commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action 
       accrues. 
 
Section 1658 was enacted on December 1, 1990. See The 
Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
Title III, S 313(a), 104 Stat. 5114. Zubi maintains that, by 
virtue of the 1991 amendments to section 1981, his lawsuit 
against AT&T is "a civil action arising under an Act of 
Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990]" and that 
section 1658's four-year limitation period governs. 
 
Zubi's cause of action for discriminatory termination of 
employment is based on statutory language that has 
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existed unchanged since its original enactment in 1870. 
See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, S 16, 16 Stat. 144. At the 
same time, it is clear that a person in his position could not 
have successfully pursued that claim prior to the 1991 
amendments to the Civil Rights Act. We must decide 
whether, for purposes of section 1658, Zubi's claim arises 
under the preexisting statutory language on which his 
claim is based or under the 1991 amendments. As we will 
explain, we hold that Zubi's claim arises under the 
preexisting statutory language, now codified in 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981(a), and, therefore, that the District Court properly 
applied New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations for 
personal injury claims. 
 
II. 
 
Like virtually all of the courts that have preceded us in 
addressing the same issue, we find the text ofS 1658 
ambiguous; it can be, and has been, reasonably read in a 
number of different ways. See generally Boyd A. Byers, 
Adventures in Topsy-Turvy Land: Are Civil Rights Claims 
Arising Under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 Governed by the Federal 
Four-Year "Catch-All" Statute of Limitations, 28 U.S.C. 
S 1658?, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 509 (1999) (detailing the various 
approaches courts have taken). Three distinct approaches 
are recognized in the existing case law: 
 
       1. When an Act of Congress passed after December 1, 
       1990, creates a claim that did not previously exist, that 
       claim "arises under an Act of Congress enacted after" 
       December 1, 1990, even though the new statute 
       creates the new claim by amending a previously 
       existing statute. This view of S 1658, when applied in 
       the context of S 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, as 
       amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, results in 
       S 1981 claims based on the discriminatory termination 
       of contracts being governed by the four-year federal 
       limitations period, and all other claims based on 
       S 1981 being governed by the state statute for personal 
       injury claims.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Miller v. Federal Express Corp., 56 F. Supp.2d 955, 965 
(W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
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       2. When an Act of Congress passed after December 1, 
       1990, amends a statute existing before that date in a 
       manner that substantially alters its meaning, all claims 
       accruing after the passage of the new statute "arise 
       under an Act of Congress enacted after" December 1, 
       1990, without regard to whether an identical claim 
       arising earlier could have been successfully pursued 
       under the prior statute. This view of S 1658, when 
       applied in the context of S 1981 of the Civil Rights Act 
       of 1870, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
       results in all S 1981 claims arising after the 1991 
       amendment being governed by the four year federal 
       limitations period.2 
 
       3. When an Act of Congress passed after December 1, 
       1990, amends a statute existing before that date, as 
       opposed to creating new law without reference to 
       previously existing statutory language, all claims 
       accruing after the passage of the amendment arise 
       under an Act of Congress enacted before December 1, 
       1990, without regard to whether an identical claim 
       arising earlier could have been successfully pursued 
       under the prior statute. This view, when applied in the 
       context of S 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, as 
       amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, results in all 
       S 1981 claims accruing after the passage of the 1991 
       amendments being governed by the state limitations 
       period for personal injury claims.3 
 
Each of the foregoing interpretations is textually plausible.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., Alexander v. Precision Machining, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1304 
(D. 
Kan. 1997). 
3. See, e.g., Lane v. Ogden Entertainment, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1261 (M.D. 
Ala. 1998). 
 
4. It is true, as some courts have stressed, that statutory amendments 
become law only when an "Act" is enacted by Congress and that the 
phrase "Act of Congress" can reasonably be read to include any 
legislative measure that amends preexisting statutory text. On the other 
hand, treating every amendment to an existing statute as a new Act of 
Congress is not required by the text of S 1658. It is common parlance to 
refer to legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1870 as an "Act of 
Congress" and to refer to causes of action as arising thereunder even 
though based on statutory provisions that have later been amended in 
some way. 
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Given that ambiguity, we turn to the rationale behind 
S 1658, as reflected in its text and legislative history, and 
seek to determine which reading of the statute will be most 
consistent with that rationale.5 
 
Congress enacted S 1658 in response to calls for a new, 
nationally uniform statute of limitations for federal causes 
of action not having their own explicit limitations period. It 
did not, however, establish a new, nationally uniform 
federal statute of limitation for all federal causes of action. 
Congress could have provided that S 1658 would be 
applicable to all causes of action that accrued after the 
effective date of the Act, but it did not. It did not because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We thus respectfully disagree with the dissent's position that the 
"plain meaning" rule dictates the resolution of the issue before us. As 
the 
dissent points out, it is clear that Congress' authority under Article III 
of 
the Constitution to bestow jurisdiction on the federal courts includes 
what is referred to as "federal ingredient" jurisdiction -- jurisdiction 
over 
cases where the plaintiff 's claim is not created by federal law but where 
a federal question is an "ingredient" of the action. Osbourn v. Bank of 
the 
United States, 9 Wheat 734 (1824). It is equally clear, however, that 
"arising under" federal law in 28 U.S.C. S 1331, which grants federal 
question jurisdiction to the federal courts, has a narrower meaning than 
"arising under" federal law in Article III of the Constitution. 
Specifically, 
S 1331 "arising under" jurisdiction does not include "federal ingredient" 
jurisdiction where Congress has determined that there should be no 
private cause of action for violation of the federal law. Merrell Dow 
Pharmeceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) ("a complaint 
alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause 
of 
action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, 
federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim `arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331.") "Arising under" thus does not have a single "plain meaning" 
even where used solely in the context of federal court jurisdiction. More 
importantly, Article III and S 1331, even if they did embody the same 
concept of "arising under," would not provide an apt analogy to S 1658. 
Article III and S 1331 primarily distinguish between cases arising under 
federal law and cases arising under state or foreign law for the purpose 
of describing judicial jurisdiction. Section 1658 seeks to distinguish 
between cases arising under certain Acts of Congress from cases arising 
under other Acts of Congress for the purpose of preserving existing 
statute of limitations case law. Because of these disparate purposes, we 
think it doubtful that Congress had the notion of federal ingredient 
jurisdiction in mind when it enacted S 1658. 
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it valued the avoidance of frustrated expectations more 
highly than national uniformity. It realized that there was 
an existing body of caselaw establishing limitations periods 
for causes of action arising under federal statutes already 
in existence, and it decided to preserve that body of law in 
the interest of avoiding the disruption of parties' settled 
expectations. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-734,S 111, at 24 
(1990) (recognizing that "with respect to many statutes that 
have no explicit limitations provision, the relevant 
limitations period has long since been resolved by judicial 
decision . . . [and that] retroactively imposing a four year 
statute of limitations . . . would threaten to disrupt the 
settled expectations of a great many parties."). Congress 
implemented this decision by stipulating that the new four- 
year statute of limitations would not be applicable to any 
"civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted" 
before December 1, 1990. 
 
Given the preeminent value placed by Congress on the 
avoidance of disappointed expectations, we conclude that 
the choice between the three proposed readings ofS 1658 
should be made on the basis of which will provide the 
greatest certainty in application. Whatever alternative is 
chosen, some line drawing on a case-by-case basis will be 
unavoidable, but every effort should be made to minimize 
the opportunities for debate. 
 
The first alternative is the one urged by Zubi. Atfirst 
blush, it seems to promise a fair degree of certainty in 
application. Did the new statute create a cause of action 
that did not previously exist? If so, S 1658 applies; if not, 
state law applies. But that promise, upon reflection, seems 
to us illusory. First, as we have pointed out, Zubi's 
interpretation results in different statutes of limitations 
being applied to plaintiffs suing under the same statute 
depending on the particular facts of their claims. Thus, for 
example, plaintiffs who invoke S 1981 because they have 
been victims of discrimination in hiring will have their 
claims governed by one statute of limitations, while 
plaintiffs who invoke the same statute because they are 
victims of a discriminatory discharge will have their claims 
governed by another. Adoption of such an interpretation 
would seem to us to generate exactly the kind of confusion 
and unfairness that Congress sought to avoid. 
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Recognition of two classes of plaintiffs under S 1981, 
when applied in a state with a statute of limitations for 
S 1981 claims larger than four years, is likely to result in 
unsuspecting plaintiffs who have relied on established 
precedent finding themselves barred from relief. Conversely, 
recognizing two classes, when applied in a state with a 
statute for S 1981 claims shorter than four years, is likely 
to result in defendants finding themselves faced with 
potential liability on claims they believed extinguished. 
 
More importantly, determining what is a "new" claim, 
created by an amendment, is a task fraught with 
uncertainty. Amendments vary in their purpose, and the 
line between an amendment that modifies an existing right 
and one that creates a new right is often difficult to draw. 
This is well illustrated by other amendments effected by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
 
Amendments frequently are intended to clarify the law 
when there has been a difference of opinion regarding the 
interpretation of an existing statute. In such situations, 
conflicting views on whether the clarifying amendment 
created new rights or merely codified the preexisting 
caselaw are what occasion the amendment. Congress in its 
deliberations over the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, 
concluded that the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), had suggested that no 
violation of Title VII occurred when discriminatory animus 
is a factor in, but not a but-for cause of, an adverse 
employment action. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), S 203, at 
45 (1991). In response, it adopted an amendment to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 "clarifying" that"an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
S 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1076. Adoption of Zubi's 
interpretation of S 1658 would surely lead to litigation over 
whether a plaintiff alleging that race was a motivating 
factor in his discharge asserts a newly-created claim or an 
old one based on the 1964 Act. See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 
47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the conflicting views 
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of the Price Waterhouse opinions on the nature of the 
required showing of causal nexus). 
 
Amendments are also frequently designed to ease the 
plaintiff 's burden of demonstrating a violation of an 
existing statute by eliminating an element of his prima facie 
case or providing a way around an affirmative defense. 
Congress, for example, understood the Supreme Court 
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989), to stand for the proposition that a plaintiff in a 
disparate-impact case established no violation of Title VII in 
the absence of an allegation and proof that the challenged 
employment practice was not a business necessity. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), SS 201-02,  at 23-45 (1991). It 
also understood Wards Cove to eliminate the preexisting 
rule that such a plaintiff could prevail, even in the face of 
a showing of business necessity, by showing an alternative 
practice with less disparate impact. See id. In response, 
Congress in 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
stipulate that a violation of Title VII is established with a 
showing of disparate impact and to restore the alternative- 
practice theory of recovery. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, S 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074. In each 
of these situations, there will be plaintiffs situated so that 
they will be able to recover under the amended statute but 
would not have been able to do so under the preexisting 
one. Are plaintiffs who are so situated asserting newly- 
created claims that did not previously exist so as to come 
within the scope of S 1658? 
 
Finally, we note that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 also 
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to authorize, for the 
first time, the award of compensatory and punitive damages 
for intentional discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, S 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74. Is a 
suit brought solely to recover such damages governed by 
the federal limitations period on the theory that these 
amendments created new claims or by the state statutes on 
the theory that they provide only an additional remedy for 
an existing cause of action? 
 
These amendments effected by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 illustrate the many categories of amendments that 
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would raise litigable issues under S 1658 if Zubi's 
interpretation of that section were adopted. Because of the 
resulting uncertainties of application, we conclude that 
embracing that interpretation would be inconsistent with 
Congress' wish to avoid unnecessary uncertainty. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the second 
suggested reading of S 1658. Under that reading, 
application of S 1658 requires differentiating amendments 
that effect only technical changes from amendments that 
"substantially alter" the meaning of the preexisting statute, 
a task that is imprecise at best. Moreover, while this 
reading avoids the confusion that would be created by 
claims under the same statutory section being governed by 
different statutes of limitations, it would be a source of even 
greater confusion because claims accruing after the 
amendment would be governed by S 1658 even though the 
identical claim could have been pursued under the 
preexisting statute and would have been governed by state 
law. Thus, even though S 1658 purports on its face to 
preserve existing limitations law, a claim underS 1981, as 
amended, for discrimination in hiring would be governed by 
a different limitations statute than an identicalS 1981 
claim that accrued prior to the 1991 amendment. We 
believe such a result would directly conflict with Congress' 
express desire to give S 1658 only prospective effect. 
 
It is the third alternative that seems to us to promise the 
least uncertainty of application. The underlying rationale of 
that reading is that when Congress amends a preexisting 
statute it does not create a "new act," and claims arising 
under the statute as amended continue to arise under the 
preexisting statute. It is, thus, only when Congress 
establishes a new cause of action without reference to 
preexisting law that S 1658 applies. Thus, when 
determining whether Congress has amended a preexisting 
statute or created a "new act," how Congress characterizes 
its own action should be determinative. We conclude that 
this is the closest thing to a bright line that can be drawn 
while remaining faithful to the statutory text and its 
legislative history. 
 
We realize that our approach will not provide an 
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indisputable answer in all situations.6  We believe that it will 
provide such an answer in the vast majority of situations, 
however, and clearly it provides such an answer here. As 
we explained earlier, Congress here chose to build upon a 
statutory text that has existed since 1870. Accordingly, we 
hold that Zubi's civil action arises under an Act of Congress 
enacted before December 1, 1990, and is governed by New 
Jersey's two year statute of limitations.7  
 
III. 
 
At oral argument in this case, it was suggested that 42 
U.S.C. S 1988 specifically provides a statute of limitations 
for civil rights actions and, therefore, that section 1658, 
even assuming that Zubi's case arises under the 1991 
amendments, is inapplicable. See 28 U.S.C.S 1658 ("Except 
as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under 
an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment 
of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years 
after the cause of action accrues.") (emphasis added). We 
instructed the parties to brief the issue, and we now hold 
that section 1988 does not provide a statute of limitations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Congress casts its legislation in a myriad of different ways, and we do 
not mean to endorse an inflexible standard predicated solely on the 
terminology utilized by Congress. At times, for example, Congress 
"amends" "Parts" of the Code by deleting them in their entirety and 
substituting an entirely different text. We do not suggest that such 
"amendments" be treated as anything other than a new act of Congress. 
We believe in most instances potential litigants will be able to identify 
situations in which Congress is building on a preexisting act and 
situations in which it is creating a new act. 
 
7. The dissent reads "action" to mean "civil lawsuit," "Act of Congress" 
to 
include anything published in the United States Statutes at Large, and 
"arising under" to mean having "an ingredient" supplied by a post-1991 
Act. If "ingredient" here means essential ingredient, then the dissent's 
approach is the functional equivalent of the "new claim" approach that 
Zubi urges and is subject to the uncertainties we have discussed. If 
"ingredient" means something less, then the dissent's approach seems to 
us likely to result in the four-year limitations period applying to any 
civil 
lawsuit containing a claim based on a statute that has been amended in 
any way after December 1, 1991. We believe that result would be 
inconsistent with the intent to preserve settled limitations law. 
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for civil actions arising under acts of Congress enacted after 
December 1, 1990, so as to preclude application of section 
1658. 
 
Section 1988 provides that the civil rights laws: 
 
       shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the 
       laws of the United States, so far as such laws are 
       suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases 
       where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
       deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable 
       remedies and punish offenses against law, the common 
       law, as modified and changed by the constitution and 
       statutes of the State wherein the court have 
       jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so 
       far as the same is not inconsistent with the 
       Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be 
       extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and 
       disposition of the cause . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1988(a). 
 
Section 1658 specifies a four-year statute of limitations 
for a class of claims (i.e., those claims arising under 
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990). It excludes from 
that class only those claims with respect to which another 
statute provides a different limitations period. Section 1988 
does not provide a specific limitations period for claims that 
would otherwise be governed by S 1658; it provides only for 
the borrowing of state rules when there are no federal rules 
suitable to carry the civil rights laws into effect. Because we 
see no reason why S 1658 is not suitable to effectuate the 
civil rights laws with respect to the class of claims to which 
it applies, S 1988 provides no authority for borrowing a 
state statute of limitations for such claims. 
 
Indeed, reading S 1988 as one of the exceptions to the 
scope of S 1658 would produce a result that Congress 
clearly did not intend. Section 1988 reflects a congressional 
preference for federal law when it may be appropriately 
applied. Nothing in S 1658 conflicts with this preference, 
and as we have indicated, it provides a limitations period 
that can appropriately be applied. Accordingly, we decline 
to read these statutory provisions in a way that would 
result in the application of state limitations law to a claim 
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within the scope of S 1658 (i.e., a claim arising under a 
federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990). 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I disagree with the majority's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1658 and with the result that it reaches in the case before 
us. The majority does not heed the established meaning of 
the terms employed in S 1658. Instead, the majority relies 
on a snippet of legislative history and its own opinion 
regarding the rule that "seems . . . to promise the least 
uncertainty of application." Maj. Op. at p. 10. This is not 
the method that we are supposed to use in interpreting 
statutes, and it is doubtful that the majority's 
interpretation will provide the certainty of application that 
the majority seeks. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
Before December 1, 1990, claims under 42 U.S.C.S 1981 
were subject to the most analogous state statute of 
limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). 
On December 1, 1990, however, the Judicial Improvement 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114, became 
law. Section 313(a) of this Act, which is codified at 28 
U.S.C. S 1658, created a new, four-year statute of 
limitations for "an action arising under an Act of Congress 
enacted after the date of enactment of this section 
[December 1, 1990]." Our task here is to construe this 
language. 
 
As the Supreme Court and our Court have repeated 
many times, in interpreting a statute, "[w]e begin by looking 
to the language of the Act. . . . When we find the terms of 
a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except 
in rare and exceptional circumstances." Rubin v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1981) (internal quotations 
omitted). See also, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Niklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 
498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991); Bread Political Action Committee 
v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982); In re Unisys Sav. Plan 
Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 444 (3d Cir. 1996) ("As with any inquiry 
of statutory construction, we start with the text of the 
statute," and thus "where Congress' will has been 
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.") (internal citations 
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omitted). If a statute uses legal terms of art, we must 
"presume Congress intended to adopt the term's ordinary 
legal meaning." Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 
F.3d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McDermitt Intern., Inc. 
v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991)). See also Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); Felix 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 
47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947) ("[I]f a word is obviously 
transported from another legal source, whether the 
common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with it."). 
 
In order to understand S 1658, we must interpret three 
terms -- "action," "Act of Congress," and "arising under"-- 
each of which has a commonly understood legal meaning. 
The term "action" refers to a civil lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 3; Black's Law Dictionary 28-29 (7th ed. 1999). 
 
The term "Act of Congress" means a law enacted in one 
of the ways prescribed by Article I, S 7 of the Constitution. 
Acts of Congress are published in the United States 
Statutes at Large, which constitute "legal evidence" of what 
the law provides. 1 U.S.C. S 112. 
 
The phrase "arising under" is of course familiar in the 
field of federal jurisdiction. Article III, S 2 of the 
Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." In 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 
(1824), the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Marshall, interpreted this provision broadly, stating that a 
claim falls within the federal judicial power if federal law 
"forms an ingredient of the original cause." Id. at 823. See 
also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1982); Verlinden B.V. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983); Gully v. First 
National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936). 
 
Congress employed the phrase "arising under" in 1875 
when it enacted the predecessor of current 28 U.S.C.S 1331,8 
which gives the district courts subject matter jurisdiction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. 
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over causes of action "arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States." The Supreme Court has 
"long construed the statutory grant of federal question 
jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power" than Article 
III, S 2. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 807 (1986). With respect to the statutory 
provision, the Court has observed: 
 
       The most familiar definition of the statutory"arising 
       under" limitation is Justice Holmes' statement,"A suit 
       arises under the law that creates the cause of action." 
       American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. , 241 
       U.S. 257, 260 (1916). However, it is well settled that 
       Justice Holmes' test is more useful for describing the 
       vast majority of cases that come within the district 
       courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing 
       which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction. We 
       have often held that a case "arose under" federal law 
       where the vindication of a right under state law 
       necessarily turned on some construction of federal law, 
       see, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 
       U.S. 180 (1921); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 
       (1917), and even the most ardent proponent of the 
       Holmes test has admitted that it has been rejected as 
       an exclusionary principle, see Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 
       U.S. 253, 270-272 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
       See also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 
       (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.). Leading commentators have 
       suggested that for purposes of S 1331 an action "arises 
       under" federal law "if in order for the plaintiff to secure 
       the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the 
       correctness and the applicability to his case of a 
       proposition of federal law." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. 
       Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal 
       Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d ed. 1973) . . . ; 
       cf. T.B. Harms Co., supra ("a case may `arise under' a 
       law of the United States if the complaint discloses a 
       need for determining the meaning or application of 
       such a law"). 
 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-9 (parallel citations to S. 
Ct. Rep. and L. Ed. omitted). 
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In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "arising under" 
in 28 U.S.C. S 1658, we must presume that Congress had 
in mind the well known interpretations of the same phrase 
in Article III, S 2 of the Constitution and/or the federal 
question statute. 
 
II. 
 
With these interpretations of the relevant statutory terms 
in mind, I turn to the particular claim at issue in this case. 
In September 1995, Madhat Zubi was terminated from his 
job at AT&T. On July 30, 1998, he commenced an action in 
federal court in New Jersey, claiming that he was 
discharged because of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981. 
 
Title 42 United States Code S1981, in its current form, 
provides as follows: 
 
       (a) Statement of equal rights 
 
        All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
       States shall have the same right in every State and 
       Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
       parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit 
       of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons 
       and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall 
       be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
       licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 
       (b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined 
 
        For purposes of this section, the term "make and 
       enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, 
       modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
       enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
       conditions of the contractual relationship. 
 
       (c) Protection against impairment 
 
        The rights protected by this section are protected 
       against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination 
       and impairment under color of State law. 
 
This provision is not itself an Act of Congress; rather, it 
is a codification of two prior Acts.9  Subsection (a) of S 1981 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Thus, it is not itself the law but only "prima facie" evidence of the 
law, 
1 U.S.C. S 204 (a). See United States National Bank of Oregon v. 
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is a codification of Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 
1874.10 Until 1989, it was unsettled whether the phrase 
"make and enforce contracts" in this provision reached the 
discriminatory termination of a contractual relationship, 
but in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989), the Supreme Court held that this language did not 
apply to conduct occurring after the formation of a 
contract. "[T]he Patterson opinionfinally decided what 
S 1981 had always meant." Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 
U.S. 288, 313 n.12 (1994). 
 
In 1991, shortly after enacting 28 U.S.C. S 1658, 
Congress broadened the scope of this provision. Section 
101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
105 Stat. 1071, amended Section 1977 of the Revised 
Statutes and defined the phrase "make and enforce 
contracts" to include the "termination of contracts and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of 
the contractual relationship." This new provision is codified 
as 42 U.S.C. S 1981(b). Thus, as a result of the 1991 Act, 
a plaintiff may now sue under S 1981 for discriminatory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 449 & n.4 
(1993). 
 
10. Subsection (a) may be traced to Section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, S 16, 16 Stat. 144, and Section 1 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. In 1874, 
however, Congress enacted into law the Revised Statutes of 1874, "a 
massive revision, reorganization, and reenactment of all statutes in 
effect 
at the time, accompanied by a simultaneous repeal of all prior ones." 
United States National Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 449. The relevant 
sections of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 were thus repealed 
and then re-enacted as section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. See 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976). 
 
When the U.S. Code was compiled, the provisions of Rev. Stat S 1977 
were codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1981. In 1991, when Rev. Stat S 1977 was 
amended, the amendments were also, of course, reflected in 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981. Section 1981 of the United States Code has never itself been 
enacted as positive law, though, and it is thus only"prima facie" 
evidence of the provisions of Rev. Stat. S 1977 as amended by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. See 1 U.S.C. S 204 (a). Cf. United States National 
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 508 
U.S. 439, 448-449 & n.4 (1993). 
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termination of employment -- and that is precisely what 
Zubi did here. 
 
Zubi filed his complaint more than two years, but less 
than four years, after his claim accrued. If his complaint is 
governed by S 1658, it was filed within the statute of 
limitations. On the other hand, if it is not governed by 
S 1658, it is subject to the most analogous New Jersey 
statute of limitations, which the District Court found to be 
New Jersey's two-year statute for personal injury actions. 
See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d 
Cir. 1991)(two-year statute applies to S 1983 actions in New 
Jersey). In my view, Zubi's claim arose under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, as well as under Section 1977 of the 
Revised Statutes, and his complaint was thus filed in time. 
 
It is beyond dispute that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
qualifies as an "Act of Congress" in the sense in which that 
term is invariably used. We would have to interpret the 
term "Act of Congress" in S 1658 in an entirely idiosyncratic 
way in order to reach a contrary conclusion. It is also clear 
that Zubi's claim of discriminatory termination arose under 
Section 101 of that Act under any of the accepted 
interpretations of the phrase "arising under." As noted, 
Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 substantially 
expanded the scope of S 1981 by prospectively defining the 
phrase "make and enforce contracts" to include the 
termination of contracts. This new definition was 
indisputably an "ingredient" of Zubi's claim. American Well 
Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260. Indeed, it was an indispensable 
ingredient. For this same reason, in any realistic sense, 
Section 101 of the 1991 Act "create[d] the cause of action" 
for racially discriminatory termination of employment that 
Zubi asserted. American Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260. 
Furthermore, "in order for [Zubi] to secure the relief sought 
he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the 
applicability to his case of [the proposition, established by 
the 1991 Act, that a plaintiff may sue under S 1981 for 
racially discriminatory termination of employment]." P. 
Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & 
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 
(2d ed. 1973). Consequently, I would hold that Zubi's claim 
is governed by the four-year statute of 28 U.S.C.S 1658 
and was not properly dismissed. 
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III. 
 
I now turn to the majority's interpretation of the statute. 
The majority pays little attention to the language of S 1658. 
Instead, after noting that district courts have adopted a 
variety of interpretations of this provision, the majority 
quickly concludes that the statute is ambiguous. See Maj. 
Op. at p. 4-6. The majority then lists three "distinct 
approaches" contained in these district court decisions, 
Maj. Op. at p. 4-5, and selects from among them based on 
what it finds to be "the rationale behind S 1658," which it 
identifies, based on a snippet of legislative history, to be the 
avoidance of disruptions of " `the settled expectations of a 
great many parties.' " Maj. Op. at p. 7 (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 101-734, S 111, at 24 (1990)), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6870. This analysis leads the majority to 
the conclusion that it is "only when Congress establishes a 
new cause of action without reference to preexisting law 
that S 1658 applies." Maj. Op. at p. 10. According to the 
majority, an Act of Congress that amends a prior Act 
(generally) does not qualify as an Act of Congress within the 
meaning of S 1658, see Maj. Op. at footnote 5, p. 6.11 
 
This interpretation cannot be squared with the language 
of S 1658, which, as noted, states that a four-year statute 
of limitations applies to "an action arising under an Act of 
Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990]." Under the 
majority's reading, however, the four-year statute is 
restricted to actions arising under some Acts of Congress 
enacted after December 1, 1990 -- namely those Acts of 
Congress that "establish[ ] a new cause of action without 
reference to preexisting law." According to the majority, an 
Act of Congress that establishes a new cause of action but 
refers to "preexisting law" in doing so does not qualify as 
"an Act of Congress" within the meaning ofS 1658. This 
interpretation of the term "Act of Congress" is not 
consistent with any known usage of the term. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This approach seems to have been inspired by a recent article. See, 
Boyd A. Byers, "Adventures in Topsy-Turvy Land: Are Civil Rights Claims 
Arising Under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 Governed by the Federal Four-Year 
"Catch-All" Statute of Limitations, 28 U.S.C.S 1658?, 38 Washburn L.J. 
509 (1999). 
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In defense of its interpretation, the majority cites the 
previously mentioned statement in the legislative history to 
the effect that Congress did not want to disturb"the settled 
expectations of a great many parties." This very general 
sentiment, however, does not support the interpretation of 
S 1658 that the majority adopts--as the current case 
illustrates. Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, no employer in New Jersey could have had a settled 
expectation that an action for discriminatory discharge 
brought under S1981 would be subject to the state's two 
year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, since 
prior to that time, S 1981 did not authorize such an action 
at all. It was not until the 1991 Act that such an action was 
possible, and by that point S 1658 had been enacted. In 
light of the clarity of the language of S 1658, when 
interpreted in accordance with standard canons of 
construction, it is not apparent that resort to the legislative 
history is appropriate. See Darby v. Cisneros , 509 U.S. 137, 
147, (1993) ("Recourse to the legislative history. . . is 
unnecessary in light of the plain meaning of the statutory 
text."). But even if the legislative history is considered, the 
single, general statement cited by the majority cannot bear 
the weight of the majority's interpretation. 
 
The principal basis for that interpretation, it appears, is 
the majority's belief that its interpretation "promise[s] the 
least uncertainty of application" and is "the closest thing to 
a bright line." Maj. Op. at p. 10. In interpreting a statute, 
however, we are not free to disregard Congress's approach 
in favor of one that seems better to us. "It is by now 
axiomatic that `the judiciary may not sit as a 
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither 
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.' 
Absent ambiguity in the statute, we cannot allow policy to 
guide our analysis." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Barry, 41 F.3d 
903, 909 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)); 
see also, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 748 (1975). In framing S 1658, Congress plainly 
passed up alternative, simpler approaches. To take just one 
example that is much simpler than either S 1658 itself or 
the majority's rule, Congress could have made the new, 
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four-year statute applicable to any claim accruing after 
December 1, 1990. Such an approach definitely would have 
provided a very "bright line rule," but Congress obviously 
thought that interests other than clarity and ease of 
application also had to be served to at least some degree. 
 
Finally, I note that the majority's interpretation may not 
provide the clarity and certainty of application that the 
majority seeks. Under the majority's approach, most Acts of 
Congress that amend prior Acts of Congress do not qualify 
as Acts of Congress under S 1658. In footnote 5, however, 
the majority says that not all enactments styled as 
amendments are real amendments, and thus some 
amendments may count as Acts of Congress under S 1658. 
See Maj. Op., footnote 5. The majority may regard this as 
"the closest thing to a bright line rule." I do not. 
 
I would hold that Zubi's claim is governed by the four- 
year statute of S 1658, and I would therefore reverse and 
remand. 
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